Climate Change: Seeing Through the Nonsense; Getting Beyond the Hopelessness

I gave a talk the other night on climate change and what we can do to keep it from being worse.  The talk started with this picture, because on earth, it's mostly about the ocean. 

Here's a link to the youtube: 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ryrWIPMfmv0&list=UUg3AgKNtozO4ebw7Gdp3cRA

Marcellus Shale Gas: Cumulative Production Trends

Data on the production of gas from wells in Pennsylvania are available from Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. (1)  I have just completed a preliminary analysis of some of these data, on horizontal wells in the Marcellus shale region of the state.  Well production data were separated into six groups.  The groups represent wells that started production in each of six different periods; the one-year period from July 2009 through June 2010, and the six-month periods from July 2010 through December 2010, January 2011 through June 2011, July 2011 through December 2011, January 2012 through June 2012, and July 2012 through December 2012.  Cumulative production records were developed for each well, and the average cumulative production curve for each of the six groups was determined.  The data are pictured in the chart above. 

Several things are clear from these data:

a. Although projection into the future of non-linear trends such as these is uncertain, if the trend of production per well continues in a consistent manner, average production per well is on track to equal at least 3 billion cubic feet (Bcf) over a 30-year period. 

 b. Production appears higher from wells that began production after the first period pictured, which ended in June, 2010.  Wells that show production for 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 periods show higher production than the first group, which has production data for 6 periods.  Perhaps this is due to increasing efficiency on the part of the gas companies, or to more recent wells being concentrated in better producing areas. 

c. Although not apparent from the chart, there is much variation among the wells.  For example, in the group that began production between July, 2010 and December, 2010, the 90^th percentile total production, as of the end of 2012, was 4.25 Bcf, while the production total at the 10^th percentile was only 0.62 Bcf.

d. Also not apparent from the chart, but clear from a closer look at the data, is that some companies’ wells are significantly more productive than the wells of other companies.  This could reflect greater expertise on the part of these companies, either in selection of drilling sites or in drilling and hydrofracturing methods, or both.

Are there implications of these data?  In my view, there are at least two conclusions that can be drawn:

1.  Actual production trends are consistent with predictions of significant long-term production of natural gas from shale formations.

2. Over the long term, increased production of natural gas could result in continuing increases of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere.  Especially problematic could be leaks of raw natural gas, a potent GHG.

It is becoming clear that emissions of GHGs could result in potentially catastrophic climate change that cannot be remediated within a human time scale.  In the face of robust future production of natural gas, arguments for a carbon tax are looking better and better.  Bipartisan support for such a tax seems to be gaining momentum.  Former secretary of state George Shultz and Nobel laureate economist Gary Becker make a strong case for a carbon tax in an editorial that appeared in the Wall Street Journal last month. (2)  They argue that a revenue-neutral carbon tax would benefit all Americans by eliminating the need for costly energy subsidies while promoting a level playing field for energy producers.

I plan to discuss carbon taxes in more detail in future blogs. 

References

(1) https://www.paoilandgasreporting.state.pa.us/publicreports/Modules/Welcome/Agreement.aspx

(2) Shultz, George, and Gary Becker, 2013, Why We Support a Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax, Wall Street Journal, April 7, 2013 (on line), April 8, p. A19 (print); http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323611604578396401965799658.html

Shale Gas EROI: Update

A while ago I posted “Shale Gas EROI: Preliminary Estimate Suggests 70 or Greater.”   I am happy to report that this analysis has been expanded, updated, and subjected to a rigorous scientific peer review.  It is now in the form of an article that I wrote with the help of a colleague, Jackie Melillo, which is now in press (1).  

The expanded analysis focuses on the Marcellus shale, and estimates that the EROI of horizontal gas wells in this region is in the range of 64:1 to 112:1, with a mean estimate of 85:1.  The EROI value is sensitive to a number of variables.  The most important of these is the total production of gas from a well.  In our analysis, Jackie and I estimated that a typical horizontal gas well in the Marcellus shale region will produce 3 billion cubic feet of natural gas over its lifetime.  Recent actual production data suggests that Marcellus wells are on track to produce at least this much.  These data will be discussed in a piece I will post shortly.

An EROI in the range of 85:1 for natural gas is surprising in light of other studies that indicate a much lower EROI.  For example, a recent article (2) depicts the EROI for electricity produced from combustion of natural gas as 7:1. 

How could EROI values for natural gas differ so much?  Although all EROI studies attempt to determine the ratio of the energy output (numerator) to the energy input (denominator), a key difference exists between natural gas and other fuels.  Approximately 8 percent of natural gas is burned, mostly at large regional compression stations (such as the one pictured), to provide the energy to process and compress the gas in order to get it to market.  How this “self-use” quantity is counted makes a big difference in the EROI calculation.  Two EROI calculation methods have been used with natural gas, the net energy ratio (NER) and the net external energy ratio (NEER).  The NER has as its numerator the net output of refined energy to society, and as its denominator the sum of all energy consumed in the energy production and refining process.  In contrast, the NEER’s denominator includes only those inputs that are consumed from the existing industrial energy system, and excludes self-use (i.e., natural gas used to process and compress the remainder of gas). 

If the NER approach is used with natural gas, the 8 percent that represents self-use is included in the denominator, and so the EROI can never be higher than about 12:1.  On the other hand, using the NEER approach, the self-use quantity is subtracted from the numerator, and only the energy actually consumed that could have been used elsewhere in society, such as diesel fuel and electricity, is included in the denominator.   For natural gas, with its large self-use component, the NEER approach leads to a higher estimate of the EROI.

The NER may be a more comprehensive measure of the total energy return from a production pathway, and likely correlates closely with environmental impacts, such as greenhouse emissions, of a pathway.  Conversely, the NEER is a more useful measure of the contribution of an energy source to the energy supply of society because it counts only the inputs that must be produced and delivered externally through the existing energy supply system.  In my preliminary study, and in the article that will soon be published, the NEER approach is used. 

References:

(1) Aucott, Michael and Jacqueline Melillo, 2013, A Preliminary Energy Return on Investment Analysis of Natural Gas from the Marcellus Shale, Journal of Industrial Ecology, in press.

(2) Inman, Mason, 2013, The True Cost of Fossil Fuels, Scientific American, April, 2013, Vol. 308, No. 4, pp. 58-61.

The hope of trees, cont'd; Ginkgo biloba

 

Several years ago, driving to work on cold days, the tips of several of my fingers started turning waxy and bloodless.  This went away when they warmed up, but it was irritating and painful. These were the same fingers that, long ago, suffered painfully from exposure to cold as I rode around on my motor scooter.  It turned out I was suffering from Raynaud's disease, which is a spasm of the blood vessels causing loss of circulation to the affected parts.  I looked online and found there was an herbal remedy reported to work; extract of Ginkgo biloba leaves. (1,2)  I got some and started taking two 500 mg capsules of the powdered leaves daily.

Unlike all herbal remedies I’ve ever tried, this actually worked.  The Raynaud’s phenomenon went away entirely, and has not returned. Ginkgo is purportedly good for the memory as well.  It stands to reason; anything that is good for your peripheral circulation should be good for your whole body. 

Ginkgo now seems like a friend to me, an important fellow traveler on this planet.  Apparently others have felt this way, for ages.  Ginkgo has long been cultivated in China; some planted trees at temples are believed to be over 1,500 years old. The tree is important in Buddhism and Confucianism, and is widely planted in Korea and parts of Japan.  It’s also widely planted in North America and Europe, in part because it tolerates urban conditions so well. (3) The wonderful author Rutherford Platt, noting that Ginkgo is closely related to trees that lived 280 million years ago, wrote, “Ginkgo should be as exciting as a crocodile on a big city street… its leaves are fern leaves, from the age of reptiles… There is no other tree like it, delivered.. from the age of dinosaurs into the heart of our teeming cities…somehow a tree evolved in a bygone age can take our ruthless cities, creating trunk, leaf and fruit from miserable dirt below the scorching pavements.” (4)

My sister-in-law Carol spotted some Ginkgos growing near where she works, and they were old enough to be bearing fruit (which doesn’t happen until they are 30 years old).  She kindly gathered a whole pile of fruits this fall, and I squeezed the seeds out of the malodorous pulp.  The seeds (pictured) are now being stratified, mixed with moist peat moss in the bottom of the refrigerator, getting happy for spring planting.  They’ll go into the ground in April, and more Ginkgo trees should be on the way. 

1.       http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12710841 accessed 2/8/13

2.       http://www.livestrong.com/article/330576-ginkgo-biloba-for-raynauds-disease/ accessed 2/8/13

3.       http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ginkgo_biloba accessed 2/8/13

4.       Platt, Rutherford, 1952, 1968, Discover American Trees, Dodd, Mead & Co., NY

We Must See Through the NRA and Act on Guns

It’s recently become abundantly clear that the U.S. has a major problem with guns in the hands of crazy people.  No other industrialized nation has anything like the rate of gun-caused deaths as we do.  It’s not likely that the U.S. has a significantly higher proportion of crazy people than other nations.  But we do have more guns.   

The National Rifle Association has to take some credit for this.  They have successfully lobbied Congress for decades to resist even moderate restrictions on gun ownership.  Some of the NRA’s recent positions seem crazy.  The NRA opposes background checks on all gun sales, opposes having to notify police when guns are lost or stolen, and supports gun ownership for people on terrorism watch lists; 75%, 64%, and 71%, respectively, of NRA members disagree with these positions.  And, while the NRA has been lobbying for national legislation making concealed handguns legal everywhere, most NRA members believe that states should make their own laws for concealed handguns.  (For background and details on this information see http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/kapil-khatter/nra-gun-control_b_2372471.html )

Why would the NRA be more extreme than its own members?  A likely reason is that the NRA is not really a gun owners’ lobby as much as it is a gun manufacturers’ lobby.   It’s become a trade organization, with large annual contributions from gun manufacturers.  And, like most trade organizations, it can be counted on to push for whatever will make its corporate members more profitable, anything that will help them sell more guns.

Congress has faced pressures from entrenched manufacturers before.  It faced such from the auto industry when it became clear, in the 1960s, that cars were causing air pollution.  It faced pressure from the chemical industry when it became clear that DDT and other chlorinated pesticides were wiping out predator birds and when it was proved that CFCs were depleting stratospheric ozone.  It faced pressure from the lead industry when it became clear that lead in paint was damaging children’s health.  Congress rose above these pressures and enacted measures that controlled these problems. 

This coming year, may Congress to take a hard look at the acute problem that virtually unbridled gun ownership has created in this country, see beyond the arguments of the NRA, cloaked in the guise of personal freedom and safety, for more sales and profits for the gun industry, and enact legislation that will lead to a major reduction in gun-related deaths.

Things Have Changed

Update: The first paragraph of the post below is as true as ever. But beyond that, what I wrote is wrong. 

My assertion that the availability of petroleum was about to decline was premature.  Interestingly, production of conventional petroleum DID peak between 2005 and 2008, just as Ken Deffeyes and several others had predicted.  What few foresaw then was the advent of fracking, which, as is now clear, changed the picture dramatically.  Fracking enables the extraction of petroleum and natural gas from the source rock itself, not just from reservoirs where these substances have accumulated.  Who knows how long fracking will continue to successfully extract fossil fuels? 

Physical things, like water, sometimes display startling and abrupt shifts in form. Apply heat to a pot of water. The water will get steadily hotter until it reaches the boiling point, and then something dramatic happens; the temperature stops rising and the water steadily turns to vapor, and disappears into the air. Something equally dramatic happens when water freezes. Subject to cold enough temperatures, water’s temperature steadily decreases, until it reaches the freezing point. Then there is no further temperature drop until the water freezes. At that point the water, now effectively transformed into the mineral, ice, continues to get colder. These sorts of shifts, or phase changes, are well known to physical scientists, but beyond the professional experience and training of most economists and social scientists.

But there probably are phase changes in economic and social systems, and it looks like we’re in the middle of one now. The growth of cheap, concentrated energy in the form of petroleum that has underpinned economic growth for generations is gone. The continued failure of mainstream economists and politicians to grapple with understanding this is becoming unconscionable.

Take a look at this chart, from an article that just came out (Murray, James and David King, 2012, Oil’s tipping point has passed, Nature, 481, 433-435). Oil economics changed markedly around 2004-2005 from elastic to inelastic supply. It seems highly unlikely that this change can be attributed to anything other than production of crude oil hitting a ceiling at about the same time. The idea that instead this marked change is due to some sort of political attitude shift that suddently occurred during that short period seems far-fetched.

The abrupt shift in behavior of the oil market looks a lot like a phase change. This shift tells us that things are different now. Things are so different that all bets are off as to the future behavior of the price of oil and the systems that have been built on the ready availability of inexpensive and steadily increasing quantities of it. It seems inevitable that the vast array of systems of the industrial world that depend on this fuel, including, especially, transportation, will go through a phase change of their own, with consequences that are perhaps nearly impossible to predict. To continue the analogy with water; if you’ve spent your whole life understanding how water behaves, you may have a hard time understanding steam.

Those in a position to help decide the future of economic and social systems have to understand that the old order has changed if they are to be able to have a chance of preventing all hell breaking loose. It seems certain that the economy cannot continue to increase its production of traditional goods and services, and the jobs that rely on these, now that the supply of cheap oil is no longer increasing. It also seems certain that we won’t be able to “grow our way out” of this recession/depression and that we’ll have to start actively looking at how a non-growing, steady state economy will function and how to get there.

Shale Gas EROI: Preliminary Estimate Suggests 70 Or Greater

A valuable measure of a fuel’s usefulness and long-term viability is its energy return on (energy) investment (EROI). This is the ratio of the energy obtained from using that fuel to the energy invested to bring that fuel to its point of use.[1],[2],[3] Back in the early days of petroleum and natural gas production, when wells were shallower and readily accessible by land routes, EROIs were probably in the range of 100 – that is, a well would return 100 units of energy for each 1 unit of energy it took to drill it and bring the product to market.

To the extent that the growth of industrial society has been supported by readily available and cheap energy (i.e., fossil fuels with high EROI), industrial economies will be increasingly stressed as easily extracted fuels are used up and replaced by fuels with lower EROI. Some analyses suggest that an EROI greater than 5 to 10 is necessary for even a limited functioning of industrial civilization and indicate that many of the newer oil wells in difficult locations, e.g. deep seas, have EROIs in the range of 10.[4]

New methods of extracting natural gas from organic-rich shales, such as the Barnett in Texas and the Marcellus in Pennsylvania and nearby regions, appear to offer promise of a large new source of natural gas. Geologist Ken Deffeyes who several years ago made what increasingly appears to be an accurate prediction that global petroleum production would peak somewhere between 2004 and 2008, regards natural gas from shale as a game-changing opportunity.[5] He considers opposition to new horizontal drilling and hydrofracking procedures as “evidence of economic suicidal tendencies.”[6] Deffeyes is a knowledgeable geologist (long ago, he was one of the early proponents of a then-controversial theory – plate tectonics). Others share the optimism; huge amounts of capital are flowing into the new shale gas plays.

But some wonder if the potential of shale gas is overblown. Geologist Arthur Berman has argued that shale gas is not economic to produce unless the wholesale price of gas rises above $7 per million Btu.[7] Others have made similar arguments.[8] . A recent report argues that the level of effort to capture significant amounts of gas from shale is so large that it is unlikely to happen, especially if the price of natural gas remains at or below the break-even point, which this report indicates is likely in the range of $4.20 to $11.50 per million Btu.[9]

The key to the future of shale gas is its EROI. I’ve been unable to find estimates of the EROI of shale gas in the literature. However, I’ve made a preliminary first-order[10] estimate that the EROI of shale gas is in the range of 70 to greater than 100. This is probably significantly better than most other energy sources available today.

This estimate is based on my interpretations of analyses by the Environmental Defense Fund[11] and the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (NYDEC)[12] which focused on the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from shale gas drilling and compressing operations. CO2 emissions are directly related to fossil fuel combustion, so these studies in effect provide estimates of the energy used to extract shale gas and get it to market. Other studies provide estimates of the ultimate production of gas from an average well[13] and on the portion of the gas that must be used to process and compress it and send it through pipelines.[14] Also included were approximate estimates of the energy it took to make the steel used for well casings and a portion of the necessary pipelines, and the concrete used in the casing process, which were apportioned based on assumptions.

The NYDEC study looked at the main tasks involved in drilling and hydrofracking, including 1) site mobilization, construction and demobilization, 2) well drilling, 3) transportation of water, etc. necessary for hydrofracking, and 4), the hydrofracking process. Using activities on well drilling sites and estimated CO2 emissions based on equipment emission factors and times of operation, this study estimated a range of CO2 emissions for each of these and several smaller tasks, depending on whether the well was near or far from necessary materials, water, etc. I chose approximate average to high-end values for these tasks of 100, 95, 400, and 325 tons of CO2, respectively. Adding in several smaller tasks as well resulted in a total CO2 emission to drill and hydrofrack a well of approximately 940 tons. Since all of this work is typically powered by diesel engines, this emission can be converted with standard conversion factors[15] to Btu consumed in the form of diesel fuel. It translates to 11.6 billion Btu.

The EDF study also inventoried activities on well drilling sites and estimated CO2 emissions based on equipment emission factors and times of operation. Its estimate, provided on a daily basis for 1000 wells completed per year, translates to approximately 1450 tons per well completion. This figure translates to 18.4 billion Btu.

These values average 15 billion Btu. To this I added 2.8 billion Btu for the embodied energy in the steel used for the well casing,[16] 1.2 billion Btu for the embodied energy in the concrete used for the well casing,[17] 1.5 billion Btu for the embodied energy of the trucks, pumps, and other equipment used in the drilling and hydrofracking process,[18] and 10 billion Btu for the embodied energy of the steel used for a portion of the pipeline necessary to transport the gas.[19] All of these embodied energy estimates involve a number of assumptions and are subject to much uncertainty and variation from well to well, but I doubt the uncertainty of any of them is more than a factor of two. The total of all these energy costs to construct a shale gas well and get its production to market is approximately 30 billion Btu.

Another, quite different approach is to estimate the total cost of a shale gas well and then use the average amount of energy associated with a dollar of gross domestic product (GDP) to translate this cost to an energy value.[20] In 2010, U.S. GDP was about $14.5 trillion, and the nation used about 100 quadrillion Btu. This translates to about 7000 Btu of energy expended per dollar. Assuming that the energy expended in drilling and hydrofracking a shale gas well bears the same relative relationship to the dollar, the approximately five million dollar estimated cost of a well and associated infrastructure[21] translates to an energy cost of 35 billion Btu.

These energy cost values must be compared with the total energy expected to be produced by an average shale gas well. There are now enough data on wells from the major shale regions to provide such an estimate. A cumulative production estimate[22] for a typical Marcellus shale well for a 10-year period of 2.11 billion cubic feet was extrapolated to a 25-year period, yielding an estimate of approximately 2.9 billion cubic feet. This translates to approximately 2.9 trillion Btu. Other estimates suggest typical total production from Marcellus wells may in the range of 5 trillion Btu.[23] This ultimate production must be reduced by 8% to account for the approximate percentage of gas that is consumed to process and compress the gas and move it through pipelines to consumers. [24]

The estimated total energy cost of shale gas extraction is thus in the approximate range of 30 to 35 billion Btu while the estimated ultimate energy produced is in the range of 2.6 trillion to nearly 5 trillion Btu. The ratio of energy produced to energy expended for shale gas based on the approaches outlined above is thus at least 70 and perhaps well over 100. This is extremely good relative to the probable EROI values for other current energy sources.

This relatively high EROI of shale gas has several implications:

1) Shale gas is not a speculative bubble that will go away. Its favorable energy balance means that economics will inexorably drive the extraction of gas from shales, especially as supplies of petroleum grow tighter. The number of wells drilled will continue to grow, as will associated truck traffic and other activity. To the extent that appropriate regulations are not put in place and enforced and/or that voluntary best management practices are not followed, damages to the landscape and pollution events are inevitable.

2) Natural gas will be in more plentiful supply than petroleum in the years to come; businesses and infrastructure that are dependent on petroleum are likely to look for ways to convert to natural gas. However, the potential size of the shale gas play should not be overestimated. It is not likely big enough to replace dwindling and ever-more-expensive petroleum on a large scale.[25]

3) Dangers of excessive regulation threatening the development of the nascent shale gas industry are probably overblown. Shale gas companies should be able to afford to adopt and enforce best practices for all that they do. Unless it can be conclusively proven that the entire industry needs protection from unnecessarily stringent regulations, a gas company’s arguments for regulatory leniency should be considered as nothing more than advocacy for that company’s own profitability.

While the embodied energy of basic materials and machinery involved in the drilling and hydrofracking processes have been considered in this analysis, some energy costs have not been considered. These include the embodied energy of labor and associated support and infrastructure (e.g. workers’ vehicles, energy costs of housing and food for workers, etc.). Further, energy costs of remediating pollution and other problems that could result from shale gas extraction have not been considered. Also, costs of impacts to resources such as water supply, while not directly comparable to energy costs, are relevant to a deeper look at EROI.

Some potential problems include:

1) Large amounts of gas may leak from extraction operations. Although there is much uncertainty, recent work suggests that such leakage of natural gas, because of its relatively high global warming potential, could be large enough to nullify the benefits of natural gas vs. coal and petroleum from a global warming perspective.[26]

2) Surface waters may be polluted by spilled or improperly treated flowback fluids and drinking water wells may be contaminated with chemicals used in the hydrofracking process or created in-situ as byproducts of this process. Several perceptive discussions of these potential impacts are available.[27],[28]

3) Gas itself, finding its way into aquifers from nearby wells, may contaminate drinking water. A recent study found levels of gas from nearby wells high enough to present explosion hazards.[29]

4) More drilling activity will generate more traffic on rural roads, resulting in more noise, air pollution, safety risks, and generating a need for road and other maintenance and improvements.

5) More drilling activity will fragment vast stretches of contiguous forest. (See photo of drilling sites in western PA.) Loss of contiguous forest is likely to accelerate the decline of many species of wildlife including neotropical migrant songbirds.


Serious efforts towards improving the efficiency of natural gas use could reduce the pressure to extract more gas and thereby reduce the incidence of negative impacts. (See, for example, earlier posts on this site on increasing home heating efficiency.)

Increased production of natural gas from shale is also likely to have positive impacts, including the creation of jobs and the flow of more money into rural areas.

If negative impacts can be controlled with best management practices, which will likely require appropriate and well-enforced regulations, shale gas could help maintain rural communities and ameliorate, to some degree, growing energy supply problems. Especially important, both from a global warming and from a safety perspective, appears to be minimizing gas leakage. It also seems critical that new supplies of natural gas not be squandered through wasteful usage; environmental costs resulting from shale gas will be lessened to the degree that less gas is used due to increased energy efficiency.

References

[1] While EROI is the key to a resource’s energy usefulness, there are important aspects to a resource’s costs that are not considered. These include its renewability, environmental impact, its size, and the need for ancillary resources and materials. For a thorough discussion of EROI and net energy see Heinberg, 2009, referenced below. . Also see Mulder & Hagens, 2008, referenced below.
[2] Heinberg, Richard, 2009, Searching for a Miracle: “Net Energy” Limits and the Fate of Industrial Society, http://www.postcarbon.org/report/44377-searching-for-a-miracle
[3] Mulder, K., and N. Hagens, 2008, Energy return on investment: Toward a consistent framework, Ambio, 37, 74-79.
[4] Hall, Charles, 2008, Why EROI Matters, The Oil Drum, http://www.theoildrum.com/node/3786
[5] Deffeyes, K., 2010, When Oil Peaked, Hill and Wang, NY, p.107
[6] http://www.princeton.edu/hubbert/current-events.html
[7] http://petroleumtruthreport.blogspot.com/
[8] http://baobab2050.org/2010/10/28/shale-gas-miracle-or-mirage/
[9] Hughes, J. David, 2011, Will Natural Gas Fuel America in the 21st Century, Post Carbon Institute, www.postcarbon.org/report/331901-will-natural-gas-fuel-america-in
[10] See Mulder & Hagens, 2008, for a further discussion of this term and of the methodological issues in EROI determination
[11] Armendariz, A., 2009, Emissions from Natural Gas Production in the Barnett Shale Area and Opportunities for Cost-Effective Improvements, prepared for Alvarez, Ramon, Environmental Defense Fund, Austin, TX, January 26, 2009, http://www.edf.org/documents/9235_Barnett_Shale_Report.pdf
[12] NYDEC, 2009, DRAFT Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Regulatory Program, NY Department of Environmental Conservation, Albany, NY, http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/58440.html
[13]Harper, John, and Jaime Kostelnik, PA Geological Survey, The Marcellus Shale Play in Pennsylvania, http://www.marcellus.psu.edu/resources/PDFs/DCNR.pdf, accessed 6/15/11
[14] U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2011, Natural gas consumption by end use, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_cons_sum_dcu_nus_a.htm. The quantities used for “lease and plant fuel” and “pipeline and distribution” in 2010 represented 8.3% of total consumption.
[15] EIA, 2011a, http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/1605/emission_factors.html
[16] Wikipedia, 2011, “Embodied Energy,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embodied_energy, and references therein
[17] Wikipedia, 2011
[18] Stodolsky, F., A. Vyas, R. Cuenca, and L. Gaines, 1995, Life-Cycle Energy Savings Potential from Aluminum-Intensive Vehicles, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL 60439. See analysis at http://michaelaucott.blogspot.com/2010/08/still-in-service-why.html, which uses this report to estimate that the embodied energy of vehicles and other machinery represents approximately 10% or less of the energy needed to operate the unit over its lifetime. This same percent of the energy used during the drilling, etc. processes was assumed to represent the energy expended in the form of embodied energy of vehicles and other equipment.
[19] Value for steel is from Wikipedia, 2011; M. Aucott assumed for this analysis that 10 miles of 20” pipeline would be installed, but that this would serve 10 wells. Energy expended for construction of pipeline was ignored. Pipelines may serve many more than 10 wells, and could last for longer than the lifetime of one well, which would lower the apportioned energy expenditure. There is considerable uncertainty with this figure.
[20] Hall, C., and M. Lavine, 1979, "Efficiency of Energy Delivery Systems:1. An Economic and Energy Analysis", Environmental Management, vol 3, no 6, pp 493-504, 1979 (First part of a 3 part article), as referenced in “North American Natural Gas Production and EROI Decline” from http://www.theoildrum.com/node/3673.
[21] Harper and Kostelnik, PA Geological Survery, 2011; $5 million dollar figure is sum of estimated cost of a Marcellus well from this the figure “Comparisons of Four Major Shale Plays” from this reference ($3.5 million) plus additional $1.5 assumed by M. Aucott to approximate the cost of associated pipelines.
[22] Harper and Kostelnik, PA Geological Survey, 2011
[23] Vanderman, Kris, 2011, Penn State University webinar, 4/21/11.
[24] EIA, 2011
[25] Hughes, 2011
[26] Howarth, R., R. Santoro, and A. Ingraffea, 2011, Methane and greenhouse-gas footprint of natural gas from shale formations, Climatic Change, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/blogs/greeninc/Howarth2011.pdf
[27] Penningroth, Steven, 2010, http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/A4105736E3A173AC85257703006B8648/$File/Pub+Comments+by+S+Penningroth+Ithaca+NY4-7-10+for+EEC+Apr+7-8+2010+Meeting.pdf
[28] http://www.energybulletin.net/stories/2011-06-20/forum-just-how-safe-%E2%80%98fracking%E2%80%99-natural-gas
[29] Osborn, S., A. Vengosh, N. Warner, and R. Jackson, 2011, Methane contamination of drinking water accompanying gas well drilling and hydrofracking, PNAS, http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2011/05/02/1100682108